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Abstract
The Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland) are widely known as progressive,
open and tolerant. However, in recent years these countries have witnessed growing intolerance towards
immigrants, particularly Muslims. This intolerance is manifested in violent attacks against foreigners and
the rise of far right, exclusionary populist parties. This paper seeks to understand what causes some
citizens in these Nordic countries to embrace anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes and other citizens to,
not only reject, but to fight such views.
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THE HAPPIEST XENOPHOBES ON EARTH: EXAMINING ANTIIMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
Maggie Zeisset
Abstract: The Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland) are
widely known as progressive, open and tolerant. However, in recent years these
countries have witnessed growing intolerance towards immigrants, particularly
Muslims. This intolerance is manifested in violent attacks against foreigners and the rise
of far right, exclusionary populist parties. This paper seeks to understand what causes
some citizens in these Nordic countries to embrace anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes
and other citizens to, not only reject, but to fight such views.
INTRODUCTION
For most, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland)
epitomize liberalism and tolerance. All of the Nordic countries rank in the top ten of the
happiest countries in the world, with Norway placed at the top; and are all known as
leaders in healthcare, education and eco-friendly innovations. The Nordic group also
contains some of the richest countries in the world. Partially due to oil revenues, all five
ranked in the top thirty-highest gross domestic product per capita countries in 2015. On
the surface, at least, the Nordic countries appear to be open societies with progressive
social norms, happy citizens, generous welfare states, and strong social solidarity. Upon
closer observation, however, the picture becomes more complicated, particularly when it
comes to anti-immigrant xenophobia.
Up “until 2001, Norway, Sweden and Denmark could be seen as a fairly liberal
bastion in the north of Europe," Rune Berglund Steen, the director of the Norwegian
Center against Racism, told the Washington Post (Noack 2015). Recently, however, there
have been signs that the Nordic countries are losing their reputation for tolerance. This
can be seen from the rise of Radical Right Parties (RRPs), which espouse nativist and
xenophobic rhetoric and policies. In June the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party
emerged from the elections as the second-largest political party with 21% of the votes,
compared to their 12% vote in the prior election (Eddy 2015). The Swedish elections in
September 2014 produced similar results with the far right Sweden Democrats becoming
the third-largest party, more than doubling their performance from four years earlier
(Shapiro 2015). In April 2014, the nationalist-oriented Finns Party emerged as the
second-largest party and in Norway, the far right Progress Party teamed up with the
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Conservatives to win the election in 2013, entering government for the first time
(Paterson 2013).
Further, for countries with generally low crime rates, there has been a pronounced
multicultural backlash marked by an uptick in the violence surrounding immigrants.
Between December and February of 2015 alone, two major attacks happened in Sweden.
On January 1st a mosque was firebombed, making it the third one bombed in Sweden
since Christmas. The mosques were tagged with swastikas as well (Shapiro 2015). Then,
in Denmark on February 14, two shootings took place in Copenhagen within hours of
each other, killing two and wounding five. The assailant was a Muslim Danish citizen
with ties to Islamic extremists (Gargiulo, Botelho, and Almasy 2015). Denmark’s
response has been to drastically cut refugees’ rights and benefits and discourage asylum
seekers.
Elsewhere, too, the Syrian migrant crisis appears to be intensifying hostile
attitudes and policies toward outsiders. Norway, the richest of the Nordic countries, has
threatened to charge anyone who tries to help refugees enter the country from the Arctic
Circle with human trafficking (Noack 2015). Finland’s government has also shown a
reluctance to accept more refugees; and though the governments of Sweden and Iceland
have been more welcoming of migrants and refugees in this current crisis, it is clear that
even Sweden is becoming reluctant to take on more migration (Noack 2015).
The evidence is all around: xenophobia is on the rise, even in the Nordic states,
but not all citizens agree with each other or with their governments regarding
immigration. The question, then, is what causes some individuals to adopt anti-immigrant
xenophobic attitudes while others, who have experienced relatively the same political
context and country demographics, remain more tolerant? This is an important question,
because anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes have been identified as key drivers of RRP
support (Rydgren 2003; van der Brug et al. 2000, 2003, 2009; Hjerm and Bohman 2014).
RRPs create anti-immigrant legislation and increase xenophobic (particularly antiMuslim immigrant) rhetoric (Hjerm and Bohman 2014). Understanding what drives antiimmigrant xenophobic attitudes would be a first step in preventing RRPs from gaining
more power and perpetuating negative frames around immigrants and immigration
(Hjerm and Bohman 2014). It would also be a start in preventing anti-immigrant and
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anti-migrant violence. The literature provides three broad approaches to explaining
political intolerance and anti-immigrant xenophobia in particular: social group
characteristics, sense of threat, and cultural attitudes/ideology.
SOCIAL GROUP CHARACTERISTIC
Religiosity
The idea that religion is a determinant of racist or xenophobic attitudes has been
strongly researched within the psychology of religion literature, but there is some
disagreement about the nature of that relationship. Scholars have argued that intrinsically
religious people internalize religious values related to “humility, compassion and love of
neighbor” (Allport and Ross 1967, 441) and are therefore tolerant in their views towards
others, including outsiders. Those who are more extrinsically religious tend to be more
“utilitarian and more dogmatic in their social attitudes as well as their religion” (Ekici
and Yucel 2014, 108), and therefore are more prejudiced against others, particularly those
they view as Other (Park et al. 1990; Rowatt and Kirkpatrick 2002; Salsman et al. 2005).
Research has also found that religious particularism, that is “to what extent people
believe there is only one true religion” (Ekici and Yucel 2014, 108) will increase
prejudice, while doctrinal beliefs (subscribing to religious beliefs) decrease prejudice
(Ekici and Yucel 2014; Eisinga et al. 1995; Konig et al. 2000; Glock and Stark 1966;
Scheepers et al. 2002b). Individual spirituality should decrease prejudice (Hood et al.
1996; Scheepers et al. 2002b; Ekici and Yucel 2014). Hjerm and Bohman argue that nonreligious people are on average more likely to oppose immigration than strongly religious
people (2014). They also argue that religious people in Protestant countries and in
countries with a low proportion of majority adherents are more tolerant than religious
people in Catholic countries and in religiously homogenous countries (2014). In this
study, all of the cases are majority Protestant and also secularized. From this literature it
is possible to derive the following testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Those who have doctrinal beliefs will be more tolerant than those
who adhere to religious particularism.
Hypothesis 2: Those who are individually spiritual will be more tolerant of
immigrants than those who adhere to religious particularism.
Age, Gender, and Education
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The empirical literature suggests that the typical profile of xenophobes is older,

less educated, and male. Women, some argue, are less likely to have racial prejudice than
their male counterparts (Ekici and Yucel 2014; Strabac and Listhaug 2008; LewinEpstein and Levanon 2005). Mudde argues that this is because, whether by biology or
structural placement in the economy, women more often hold nurturance roles (2007).
Age also seems to play a role in prejudice or xenophobic attitudes. Researchers argue that
the younger generations tend to be more educated and more open-minded than the older
generation (Roemer and Van der Straeten 2004; Knudsen 1997; Ekici and Yucel 2014).
Hence, older people would be expected to be more xenophobic and less tolerant of
difference in general. This, however, cuts against the empirical reality that the support
base of most RRPs tends to be young. Part of the explanation may lie in education and
occupational sector. Individuals with higher levels of skill are more likely to be proimmigration in high per capita gross domestic product (GDP) countries, while lower level
skilled workers will be more likely to have anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes
(Yakusko 2009; O’Rourke 2004; Mayda 2004). The Nordic countries all have high GDP
per capita, so it should follow that high skilled workers within those countries will be
more tolerant. Education levels have also been linked to the idea that higher skilled
workers will have had more education and, therefore, will be more tolerant than those
will a lower education (Mayda 2004; Bohman 2011; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009;
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Kunovich, 2004).
Hypothesis 3: Women will be slightly less xenophobic than men.
Hypothesis 4: Young people will be slightly more tolerant of immigrants than the
older generation.
Hypothesis 5: More highly educated people will be less likely to exhibit antiimmigrant xenophobia.
Sense of Threat
According to both group threat theory and group conflict theory, when two groups
compete for limited resources or the same goal, frustrations arise and exacerbate conflict,
prejudice, and discrimination. When groups are, or perceive themselves to be, in conflict
with other groups for valued resources such as money or power, intergroup tensions and
prejudice may surface (Ekici and Yucel 2014, Weldon 2006). Specifically, unemployed
individuals appear to have significantly higher anti-immigrant prejudice; and those with
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less wealth are more likely to express racial prejudice (Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Ekici
and Yucel 2014). Group threat theory, in turn, differentiates between two different kinds
of perceived threat, specifically “realistic” and “symbolic” (Weldon 2006; Schlueter et al.
2008; Tolsma et al. 2008; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Hooghe et al. 2013; Ekici and Yucel
2014). Limited jobs and other valued resources in the economy are examples of realistic
threats. Symbolic perceived threat, on the other hand, involves the idea that the outgroup
might disrupt the cultural and religious values of the majority group.
Much of the literature argues that those with lower socioeconomic status will have
stronger anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes than those with higher socioeconomic
status (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Svallfors 2006; Weldon 2006; Ekici and Yucel
2014). Other research claims that during a slow economy natives may be more liable to
scapegoat immigrants and ethnic minorities. The state of the economy as a whole may
influence citizens’ attitudes more than their own personal situations. Consequently,
tolerance should rise in prosperous times and decline when the economy is in recession
(Weldon 2006). Economic instability has been shown to activate xenophobic attitudes,
especially when there is a perceived threat that foreigners are taking away jobs from
native workers (Yakushko 2009; Watts 1996; Radkiewicz 2003). It stands to reason that
individuals within these countries that are experiencing unemployment or economic
instability will be more xenophobic because these individuals will feel more threatened,
perceiving foreigners to be a new competition for economic resources. Therefore, when
unemployment rates increase, intolerance towards immigrants may also increase. The
threat literature also notes that individual-level xenophobia may be stimulated as much or
more by a sense of cultural threat than by the fear of job loss. This aspect of perceived
threat can be manifested through an individual’s attitudes and ideology, forming a third
broad approach to explaining anti-immigrant xenophobia. From this it is possible to
derive the following:
Hypothesis 6: Less affluent individuals will be more likely to exhibit antiimmigrant xenophobia.
Hypothesis 7: Those who are experiencing unemployment will be more likely to
exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia.
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Nationalism
It stands to reason that individuals who feel a strong sense of national pride will
feel threatened by and hostile to out-group members. Research has argued that individual
and group national identity focus results in stronger negative views of foreigners. The
research also argues that nationalism, or belief in the superiority of one’s nation over
others, affects xenophobia (Esses, Dovidio, Semenya, and Jackson 2005; Yagushko
2009). There is a particular form of nationalism, at the ideological core of nativism, one
in which foreign influences are viewed as suspicious and are seen to harbor the
possibility of a dangerous attack from within (Ward 2014). O’Rourke (2004) argues that
anti-immigrant preferences are partially caused by strong feelings of national identity,
coupled with an associated set of patriotic and nationalist attitudes, including pride in
country and sense of national superiority. The following hypotheses can be derived:
Hypothesis 8: Those that feel a strong sense of nationalism will be more
xenophobic than those with less expressed national pride.
Satisfaction
According to Weldon (2006) satisfaction with democracy is one of the three key
variables shown to predict tolerance. Citizens who feel dissatisfied with the democratic
functioning in their country have been shown to exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobic
attitudes (Knigge 1998; Kestila 2006; Dowley and Silve 2007). The status of immigrants
as “foreigners” makes them easy targets for many who feel frustrated with the democratic
process.
Weldon (2006) also identifies another type of satisfaction that has been shown to
be an indicator for anti-immigrant attitudes. This research argues that strong in-group
identities, low self-esteem, and perceptions of threat play a significant role in tolerance
judgments. Studies have shown that those who feel unhappy with their own lives, along
with other factors, will be more xenophobic than those who are happy or content. Those
who were unhappy with their own lives tended to see immigrants as not only a threat to
their country and economic status, but also to their personal happiness and well-being
(Holman 1994, Weldon 2006, Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011). Hence:
Hypothesis 9: Satisfaction with and trust in government will reduce antiimmigrant xenophobia.
Hypothesis 10: Those who identify as satisfied with their lives will be less likely
to exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia.
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Ideology and Political Interest
Political interest and ideological position are two individual attributes of interest.
The degree of political interest might influence the effects of political articulation
because less politically interested individuals pay less attention, therefore they might
attach less meaning to what is said by politicians. Politically aware individuals, on the
other hand, may be more inclined to absorb certain messages if promoted by political
elites that have their attention and values (Zaller, 1992, Bohman 2011). The reverse effect
could also be possible. Limited interest in political positions may reinforce such effects,
instead of reducing them. However, research has shown that right-leaning individuals are
generally more likely to hold negative attitudes towards minorities than individuals on the
left (Gorodzeisky, 2011; McLaren, 2003; Semyonov et al., 2008; Bohman 2011). From
this literature it is possible to derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 11: Those that are right-leaning ideologically will be more likely to
exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia than those that lean to the left.
Hypothesis 12: Those who are more politically aware will be more tolerant
towards immigrants.
Table 1: Hypotheses
Social Group Characteristics
Hypothesis 1: Those who have doctrinal beliefs will be more tolerant than those who adhere to religious
particularism.
Hypothesis 2: Those who are individually spiritual will be more tolerant of immigrants than those who
adhere to religious particularism.
Hypothesis 3: Women will be slightly less xenophobic than men.
Hypothesis 4: Young people will be slightly more tolerant of immigrants than the older generation.
Hypothesis 5: More highly educated people will be less likely to exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia.

Sense of Economic Threat
Hypothesis 6: Less affluent individuals will be more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant xenophobia.
Hypothesis 7: Those who are experiencing unemployment will be more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant
xenophobia.

Sense of Cultural or Lifestyle Threat
Hypothesis 8: Those that feel a strong sense of nationalism will be more xenophobic than those with less
expressed national pride.
Hypothesis 9: Satisfaction with and trust in government will reduce anti-immigrant xenophobia.
Hypothesis 10: Those who identify as satisfied with their lives will be less likely to exhibit anti-immigrant
xenophobia.
Hypothesis 11: Those that are right-leaning ideologically will be more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant
xenophobia than those that lean to the left.
Hypothesis 12: Those who are more politically aware will be more tolerant towards immigrants.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The current study marshals survey data from the 2008 European Values Survey
(EVS) in order to test hypotheses derived from three competing approaches to explaining
intolerance toward minorities (defined as immigrants). By analyzing individual responses
among only the Nordic countries, it is possible to control for broad cultural and
developmental similarities, such as, purchasing power parity (PPP)/per capita, human
development, gender empowerment, strong left wing parties, and shared cultural history.
This makes it possible to control for some of those broad country-level features and hone
in on the individual level factors that cause individuals to differ in their attitudes toward
immigrant outsiders. Nordic xenophobes are not intolerant because they come from a
poor or economically unstable country or a Catholic-conservative cultural environment.
Other factors must account for variations between xenophobes and non-xenophobes and
in the level of xenophobia across countries within the Nordic bloc.
Graph 1 shows the variation between countries. Those that were scored as a (3) or
(4) on the intolerance scale were grouped together as those who answered enough
questions to be considered xenophobic towards immigrants. From this graph, Norway
and Sweden stand out. Norway has the highest percentage of those who exhibit antiimmigrant xenophobia with fifty-nine percent of those surveyed in Norway scoring as a
(3) or (4) on the intolerance scale. Sweden, on the other hand, only has around 40 percent
of those surveyed answering questions in an anti-immigrant xenophobic attitude. That is
nearly a 20-point difference. This could mean that there are some country-specific
variables that this study has not picked up on. There might have been something specific,
culturally or politically, happening in 2007 in either of these countries that caused this
difference. The rise of RRPs at different times in these countries could also contribute.
The 2008 EVS dataset includes all necessary individual level information to code
for anti-immigrant xenophobia, as well as all of the independent variables identified in
the literature review. The dependent variable, anti-immigrant xenophobia, involves a
composite scale created from 13 separate question items that dealt with intolerance
towards. The EVS asked, for example, whether respondents feel that immigrants are a
strain on the country, if immigrants make crime problems worse, and if immigrants are a
threat to the country immigrants (See Appendix for full list of questions). Respondents
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were also asked if they would not want any group of people as neighbors. This question
included Muslims and immigrants among the choices. In all thirteen questions those who
gave an intolerant answer were coded as (1), while all other responses were coded as (0),
to create a 13-point summative scale. That scale was later collapsed into 1-4 scale
running from least-to-most intolerant.
For the satisfaction with government variable an index was created using three
2008 EVS questions. These questions asked individuals how confident they were with
their government, how satisfied they are with democracy in their country and how they
believe things are going with their government. Those that answered positively were
coded as (1) and those who answered negatively were coded as (0). Similarly, in order to
measure the “satisfaction with self” variable two EVS questions were summed. One
question asked how satisfied respondents are with their lives in general. Respondents that
answered they were satisfied were coded as (1) and those who were not satisfied were
coded as (0). The second question asked respondents how happy they are. Those that
answered very happy or quite happy were coded as (1) and those that answered not very
happy or not happy at all were coded as (0).
The ideology variable also reflects a summative scale based on three EVS
questions. The first question asked the respondents to place their political views on a
left/right scale from 1-10, 1 being left and 10 being right. Those that answered between 1
and 3 were coded as (0), while those that answered between 4 and 6 were coded as (1).
Those that answered 7 or 8 were coded as (2) and those who answered 9 or 10 were
coded as (3). The second and third questions were handled in the same manner.
Respondents were asked if they would vote in an election. If they answered yes they were
then asked in a separate what party they would vote for and if they answered no then they
were asked what party most appeals to them. EVS then placed their answer on a left/right
scale based on what party they chose. The responses were then coded the same way as
the first question.
For political interest three EVS questions were summed. The first question asked
respondents if they volunteered for any political organizations or parties. Those that
answered yes were coded as (1), while all others were coded as (0). The second question
asked if respondents they would vote if there was an election tomorrow. Those that
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answered yes were coded as (1) and those who said no were coded as (0). The third
question asked how interested the respondent was in politics. If the respondent answered
“very interested” the response was coded as (2) and those that answered somewhat
interested were coded as (1). Those who answered not very or not at all interested were
coded as (0).
For religiosity, a scale was created using five EVS questions. These questions
asked respondents how often they attend church, how often they pray, if they believe in
heaven, and if they consider themselves religious. For church attendance and prayer
frequency, those that said they attended church more than once a week or prayed
everyday or more than once a week were coded as (2) and those that said they attended
church or prayed once a week were coded as (1). All others were coded as (0). For the
other questions, those that answered that they considered themselves as religious were
coded as (1) and those that said they believed in heaven were also coded as (1). All other
answered were coded as (0). In order to only capture Christian religiosity, responses were
selected only if the respondent self-identified as Protestant, Catholic or free church/nonconformist/evangelical. Following previous literature, variables were created for those
who identify as individually spiritual and those that exhibit religious particularism (or the
idea that there is one true religion). Those that answered that they believed there was
some sort of spirit or life force, but not a personal God were coded as (1) and all others
were coded as (0). Those that answered that they believed there was only one true
religion were coded as (2) and those who believed there was only one true religion, but
that other religions do contain some basic truths were coded as (1). All others were coded
as (0).
Gender was recoded to reflect the category expected to exhibit anti-immigrant
xenophobic attitudes (male=1 and female=0). Age was treated the same way with those
who were aged 15-24 as (1), 25-34 as (2), 35-44 as (3), 45-54 as (4) and 55 or older as
(5). Education responses were given according to the highest level of education
completed and were recoded by EVS as low (1), middle (2) and high (3). Those who are
employed were coded as (1) and those who are unemployed were coded as (0).
Nationalism was measured by how proud the respondent was to be a citizen of his or her
country. Those who were very proud were coded as (2) and those who were quite proud
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were coded as (1). All other answers were coded as (0). Wealth was coded based on the
monthly income in Euros. The monthly income was used because Sweden was one of the
few countries to not be given the yearly income question. The variable was recoded so
that those who made 999 Euros a month of under were coded as (1). Those who made
1,000 Euros to 4,999 Euros a month were coded as (2) and those who made 5,000 Euros
or more were coded as (3). Appendix 1 contains all EVS questions used.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The following analysis begins with bivariate correlations in order to offer an
initial test of the hypotheses. A linear regression model is then used to more directly test
the strongest variables from each school of thought against one another.
Bivariate Results
Bivariate correlations shown in Table 2 support the hypotheses presented for the
social group characteristics variables and confirm much of the prior literature. Aside from
Christian religiosity, all of the variables are significant. Religious particularism and
individual spirituality are both significant and support the first and second hypotheses.
Those who believe that there is only one true religion are more likely to be intolerant
towards immigrants, while those who recognize that there is some sort of spirit or life
force are less likely to be xenophobic. The most significant and robust variable among
the three religion variables is religious particularism, which may point to a shift towards
anti-Muslim sentiments and zero-sum cultural rhetoric.
Age, gender and education correlate with intolerance as predicted. Gender and
education are statistically significant and negatively correlated with intolerance towards
immigrants. Age has a statistically significant positive correlation with intolerance
towards immigrants. Therefore, those with higher education will be less likely to be
intolerant towards immigrants. Males and the older generations are slightly more likely to
be intolerant towards immigrants.
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Variables (Social Group Characteristics)
Independent Variable
(Intolerance)
Education

-.179**

Gender

-.086**

Age

.030*

Christian Religiosity

.017

Religious
Particularism

.106**

Individually Spiritual

-.056**

* - Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

The hypotheses presented for economic sense of threat (shown in Table 3) predict
that those who are employed, as well as those with high income will be less likely to be
intolerant towards immigrants. There is a significant negative correlation between
employment and intolerance, as well as income and intolerance. This provides support for
the sense of threat theory, and economic threat in particular.
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Variables (Sense of Economic Threat)
Independent
Variable
(Intolerance)
Employment

-.081**

Income in Euros

-.063**

* - Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

However, these two variables are not as robust or significant as the variables
associated with the sense of cultural or lifestyle threat (shown in Table 4). Some of these
cultural threat variables are the most statistically significant out of all the variables.
Hypothesis eight predicts that those who describe themselves as nationalist are more
likely to show intolerance towards immigrants. Bivariate correlations bear this out.
Hypotheses nine and ten predict that satisfaction with government and satisfaction with
self will both negatively correlate with intolerance. This is also supported at a statistically
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significant level. However, government satisfaction is more significant than self
satisfaction. Political interest is also one of the most significant variables. It shows a
negative correlation with intolerance towards immigrants. This is interesting because
there has been debate in the literature about whether political interest will increase or
decrease one’s intolerance. This finding might be different if the countries studied were
more diverse, with a more right-wing centered state. Ideology was the strongest
correlation found. As predicted, there is a positive correlation between right-wing
ideology and intolerance towards immigrants. The strongest variables from each school
of thought can be seen in their own bivariate table (Table 5).
Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Variables (Sense of Cultural or Lifestyle Threat)
Independent Variable
(Intolerance)
Ideology

.201**

Political Interest

-.138**

Nationalism

.198**

Government Satisfaction -.106**
Self Satisfaction

-.067**

*- Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Table 5: Correlation Matrix of Variables (Strongest Variables by School)
Independent Variable
(Intolerance)
Education

-.179**

Religious Particularism

.106**

Employment

-.081**

Income in Euros

-.063**

Ideology

.201**

Political Interest

-.138**

National Pride

.198**

* - Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

	
  

14 RES PUBLICA XXI
Multivariate Results
Results of an OLS regression model are presented in Table 6. The strongest
independent variables for each of the three schools were selected from the bivariate
correlation results: social group characteristics (religious particularism and education),
sense of economic threat (income and employment), and political ideology and attitudes
(ideology, nationalism and political interest). As can be seen in the table, all seven
variables remain statistically significant. However, the economic threat indicators appear
weakest and least significant, when other factors are held constant. This stands in contrast
to the more robust and significant indicators of ideology, nationalism, and political
interest, suggesting that in the Nordic countries the perception of immigrants as economic
threat has shifted to a perception of immigrants as a cultural threat. This is in keeping
with the growing perception of cultural threat from Muslims, so that Islamophobia may
now be the dominant form of anti-minority sentiment in Europe. Michelle Hale Williams
argues that RRP rhetoric and xenophobia has shifted from a fear of immigrants as an
economic threat to the fear of Muslim immigrants as a cultural threat (2007). This shift is
consistent with the findings in this study. The relatively modest model R2 (.138) suggests
that there is much variance yet to be explained in anti-immigrant intolerance among
Nordic publics. Future research could examine this aspect more clearly, by using
specifically anti-Muslim xenophobia, instead of anti-immigrant xenophobia.
Table 6: Multivariate Model
Variable

B

S.E.

Sig.

Religious Particularism

.172

.033

.000

Education

-.193

.017

.000

Income in Euros

-.067

.027

.015

Employment

-.076

.029

.010

Ideology

.111

.008

.000

Nationalism

.191

.018

.000

Political Interest

-.149

.014

.000

Adjusted R2 = .138
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CONCLUSIONS
For years the Nordic countries have been seen as the “almost nearly perfect
people” because of their progressive social norms, generous welfare, happy citizens and
tolerance (Booth 2014). However, underneath this strong liberalism, there is a growing
strain of anti-immigrant xenophobia. This can be seen in the rise of Radical Right Parties,
a vicious multicultural backlash in countries with extraordinarily low crime rates, and
reluctance to accept more immigrants. This study sought to understand why some citizens
adopt anti-immigrant xenophobic attitudes while others, who have experienced relatively
the same political context and country demographics remain more tolerant. Scholars have
argued for three different explanations: social group characteristics, sense of economic
threat and sense of cultural or lifestyle threat. In the past, sense of economic threat had
been considered a major indicator of xenophobia. However, in this study economic threat
seemed to be less of an indicator when compared with sense of cultural or lifestyle threat.
In fact, sense of cultural or lifestyle threat appears to be the most significant driver of
intolerance. This could be because a shift is starting to take place that is more concerned
with the fear of Muslim immigrants as threats to the culture and security of a country,
instead of as an economic threat. Despite which explanation is correct or the most
significant, the problem remains the same: anti-immigrant xenophobia is prevalent and is
affecting even the most tolerant and open-minded countries.
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